This study uses a hazard model with data on 3392 corporate bankruptcies by U.S. public companies during 1983-2008 to determine the effect of industry-based structural constraints on bankruptcy predictions. The probability of bankruptcy is significantly higher for firms in highly concentrated industries and with relatively stronger customer dependency. Most bankruptcy predictions reflect the variation of a firm's characteristics relative to its industry, but industry-specific characteristics have negligible impacts. The investigation also includes a comparison of the relative performance of accounting and market-based variables, in terms of both in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. For yearly data, the best model includes both accounting and market-based variables. However, for monthly market data and quarterly accounting reports, the best model features only market data. The usefulness of accounting measures in bankruptcy prediction models thus may be contingent on sampling frequency.
Introduction
Two factors likely determine the forecasting accuracy of corporate bankruptcy hazard rate models. Specifically, we are interested in the effects of the intensity of competition and the degree of connection with customers and suppliers in a given industry, as well as potential distortions in accounting information across different time spans (e.g., quarterly versus yearly reports). If accounting signals in financial reports are less informative at the quarterly than at the yearly level, the latter should provide more accurate bankruptcy forecasting. Moreover, industry structural constraints should affect firms' operating strategies, financial structure decisions, and profitability, and therefore their bankruptcy likelihood. Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) indicate that bankruptcy reflects industry demand conditions, and Chava and Jarrow (2004) provide empirical support but use only dummy variables, without discussing specific factors. We instead determine just how bankruptcy might be influenced by a set of structural constraints within each industry.
Growing research based on hazard rate models compares the relative merits of accounting and market-driven variables for bankruptcy forecasting. Shumway (2001) finds that combining the two can produce accurate forecasts; Chava and Jarrow (2004) instead suggest that monthly and quarterly observations significantly improve the forecasting performance of both accounting and market-based models, compared with yearly observations. This result is consistent with the idea that timely information provision is particularly useful in forecasting bankruptcy. However, the contribution of accounting variables grows negligible in the presence of market variables; we therefore consider whether previous results still hold when we rely on an extended database and a more recent period. 1 To assess the effect of an industry's structural constraints on bankruptcy predictions, we consider corporate bankruptcies by U.S. public companies during the period from 1983 to 2008. Our in-sample tests include the full sample; for our out-of-sample tests, we use data from [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] to fit the hazard model, then adopt the estimated coefficients to forecast bankruptcies during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Both the in-and out-of-sample tests indicate that the probability of bankruptcy is significantly higher for firms in highly concentrated industries, compared with similar firms in industries with lower degrees of concentration. We also find that firms that depend more on customers have higher bankruptcy probabilities than firms with lower dependency levels. Both findings highlight the risks inherent in low flexibility, whether in the kind of product offered to the market (i.e., concentrated industries tend to produce specialized products) or the customers served. We also find that our ability to predict bankruptcy depends almost completely on the variation of a firm's characteristics from its industry; industry-specific characteristics instead have a negligible impact on this accuracy level.
Regarding the relative performance of accounting and market variables, both in their in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, we find that models based on yearly data have 25% more explanatory power on average than models based on monthly and quarterly data. When using yearly data, the best model (in and out-of-sample) includes both accounting and market-based variables, but if we employ monthly market data and quarterly accounting data, the best model only includes market data. On the one hand, this finding suggests potential distortions in quarterly accounting signals, for which financial reporting flexibility is much wider than it is at the yearly level. This flexibility may allow managers to produce quarterly reports that fail to reflect the underlying economic fundamentals, such that the usefulness of accounting measures in bankruptcy prediction models may be contingent on sampling frequency. On the other hand, an alternative explanation is based on the hypotheses that market prices reflect all publicly available information regarding bankruptcy because for monthly data, market variables are updated more quickly than are the quarterly accounting variables. For yearly data, updating of both market and accounting variables occurs at the same frequency.
In turn, we contribute to empirical literature on bankruptcy prediction in several ways. We confirm the importance of accounting for the degree of concentration in the industry, the dependency of customers, and the firm's characteristics relative to its industry when forecasting bankruptcies. We note the relative explanatory power of market and accounting variables in hazard models and document differences when using yearly or quarterly accounting data; we recommend the former in terms of its forecasting ability.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we relate relevant literature to our hypotheses about the effect of industry constraints in bankruptcy prediction. Then in Section 3, we define our data. Section 4 contains the bankruptcy prediction model and a discussion of the empirical results, both in-sample and out-of-sample, and Section 5 offers the model of within-and across-industry variables.
We conclude in Section 6.
Bankruptcy Prediction with Internal and External Industry Constraints
Previous literature has noted the correlation between bankruptcy likelihood and a firm's capital structure; see Titman and Wessels (1988) . Although Chava and Jarrow (2004) provide empirical evidence of the importance of industry effects, as far as we know, the actual influence of industry characteristics on bankruptcy likelihood has not been addressed. To investigate this point, we measure structural constraints both within and across industries; accordingly, we propose two hypotheses with respect to internal and external industry constraints.
Internal Industry Constraints
Industrial organization literature reveals that the structure of product markets affects managers' operating decisions (Brander and Lewis, 1986) . The consequences of operating decisions may affect the risk of a firm's cash flows and therefore stock returns. The structure of product markets also determines firms' capital structure choices and therefore their leverage risk. Firms with a high leverage risk are more likely to file for bankruptcy, given their high level of debt compared with their equity. Opler and Titman (1994) argue that customers are more reluctant to purchase products from a distressed firm with specialized products that may need servicing.
Because firms in highly concentrated industries are more likely to produce specialized products, they become more vulnerable to financial distress. In concentrated industries and weak economies, highly leveraged firms thus tend to lose more market share than do conservatively financed competitors, which implies even greater losses for financially distressed firms in concentrated industries.
In line with risk-based return considerations, Hou and Robinson (2006) posit that lower expected returns for firms in highly concentrated industries result because they face fewer risks. A conventional view suggests that firms that bear more risk need to provide higher returns as compensation, though Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) empirically contradict that claim. Financially distressed stocks deliver anomalously lower returns but much higher standard deviations, market betas, and loadings on value and small-cap risk factors than do stocks with low default risk. In other words, firms with lower returns may have higher, not lower, risks. In turn, the relationship between the degree of industry concentration and firm risk remains an open question for empirical investigation.
Overall, firms in highly concentrated industries may be more likely to file for bankruptcy for two reasons. First, they tend to become more leveraged than firms in less concentrated industries. Second, firms in concentrated industries provide low average stock returns but suffer from relatively high volatility, as suggested by Campbell et al. (2008) . We hypothesize in turn that Hypothesis 1: The higher an industry's concentration ratio, the higher the incidence of bankruptcy among its firms.
To proxy for the degree of concentration in an industry, we employ its concentration ratio, or the inverse of the intensity of industrial competition. We use a Herfindahl index to measure the degree of industry concentration in industry j as follows:
where s ij is the market share of firm i in industry j. Small values imply that the market contains many competing firms; large values imply that few large firms dominate the market. To construct the Herfindahl measure, we use the entire distribution of industry market share (i.e., net sales) information to assess the degree of industry concentration. For this study, we compute the Herfindahl index for each year (yearly data set) or month (monthly data set) and for each industry. Because the industry's internal constraint is the competition between producers in the same market seeking the same business, the inverse Herfindahl index offers a good proxy of industry internal constraints.
External Industry Constraints
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) argue that financial distress at one firm links not only to the product market (internal industry) but also to external industries, because firms connect with customers and suppliers in other (external) industries. We thus consider how external industry constraints may influence bankruptcies, especially in relation to customers and suppliers. Although a firm's customers and suppliers might belong to the same industry as the focal firm, our hypothesis refers only to those in other industries.
The trade-off theory of capital structure implies that the actions of distressed firms' customers and suppliers increase indirect costs and can worsen financial distress or even result in bankruptcies. On the one hand, when customers confront a supplier in distress, they likely impose costs and find new suppliers to replace it, due to their concerns about product quality, reduced warranty value, continuity of supply, and serviceability. On the other hand, when suppliers find a customer in financial distress, they may impose costs by failing to supply trade credit, backing away from long-term contracts, or delaying shipments. This viewpoint emphasizes the potential importance of indirect costs, such that we anticipate that firms that depend more on their customers and suppliers suffer higher indirect costs when in financial distress. In more general terms, a firm with greater dependence on its customers and suppliers has more chances to interact with them in all states of nature, including in distress states.
However, the magnitude of the indirect costs is difficult to estimate. Burt (1988) offers that the competitive advantages of firms increase with the weakness of the connections among customers and suppliers in their industry. Burt (1983 , 1988 ), Talmud (1994 ), and Yasuda (2005 further suggest that both customer and supplier constraints negatively affect a firm's economic performance. Moreover, in an industry with low bargaining power (i.e., higher customer and supplier dependency or constraints), corporate strategies depend more on customers and suppliers, which increases the costs of gathering resources and distributing products.
Theoretical and empirical work on capital structure also has addressed economic links to customers and suppliers during financial distress episodes. Regarding non-financial stakeholders' (NFS) bargaining power, Kale and Shahrur (2007) find that a firm tends to have higher debt ratios when its customers and suppliers take strong bargaining positions. Firms with more debt have more chances to file for bankruptcy. Yet Sarig (1998) shows that when a firm worries about suppliers threatening to curtail its specialized factors of production, it will limit its leverage both before and after contracting, to prevent potential NFS hold-up behavior.
Lowering the debt ratio should reduce the likelihood that unstable supply will lead to the firm's liquidation. However, we find no clear conclusion about the effect of suppliers' bargaining power on firms' leverage, nor do we have any compelling arguments about whether suppliers' constraints raise the firm's bankruptcy chances or not.
Customers' constraints often arise when one specific supplier is closely connected to its buyers. The supplier suffers a weaker bargaining power position and also suffers more losses when its buyers cannot pay, especially during financial distress periods. In a booming economy, a supplier that faces high customer constraints earns lower profits; in a bust economy, it cannot collect payments from its customers. Thus both forces imply that firms with more customer constraints are more likely to file for bankruptcy.
On the other side, high supplier constraints indicate that the firm has a stronger connection to its suppliers. It again takes a weaker bargaining power position but does not suffer the same potential monetary losses, because it is the customer, obligated to pay its suppliers, not receive payments. Therefore, a firm facing strong suppliers' constraints may not go bankrupt as easily as a firm with high customers' constraints.
Thus we formulate our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The stronger a firm's customers' constraints, the higher its incidence of bankruptcy. The relationship between a firm's suppliers' constraints and its bankruptcy is unclear.
We use a measure of external industry constraints proposed by Burt, Guilarte, Raider, and Yasuda (2002) , which begins with a consideration of resource dependence, or the extent to which producers in a market depend on another market to buy or sell, directly or indirectly. They simultaneously consider constraints derived from customer and supplier markets. To investigate the impact of customers' and suppliers' constraints on bankruptcy prediction specifically, and following Shih's (2007) suggestion, we partition Burt et al.'s (2002) combined measure of external industry constraints into customers' constraints and suppliers' constraints. Burt et al. (2002) measure external constraints on industry i as the sum of transaction-specific constraints on the market, using the value of commodities sold to industry j from industry i. We denote C i,B and C i,S as customers' and suppliers' constraints, respectively, in industry i, then calculate them using the following method: constraints as an example: The squared term in Equation (2) is the degree of direct and indirect dependence of industry i on market j, measured by p ij , or the proportion of industry i's sales that occur directly to market j, plus the proportion of industry i's sales that indirectly involve market j through market q. Then H j is the extent to which the buyer market j is oligopolistic. Finally, C i,B and C i,S vary between 0 and 1, and the later scenario implies the maximum constraint. A firm in an industry with C i,B (C i,S ) equal to 0 has maximal bargaining power as a supplier (customer).
Data
For our empirical study, we select all firms traded on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and those with available data in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT databases to construct explanatory variables. To discriminate bankrupt firms from non-bankrupt ones, we adopt a broad definition of bankruptcy that includes firms delisted due to bankruptcy, liquidation, or poor performance (Dichev, 1998; Brockman and Turtle 2003) . Bankrupt firms in our sample meet two conditions: They were listed in the CRSP database but then were delisted during our sample period, and the delisting code reported by CRSP equals 400 or 550-585. 2 We identify 3392 bankruptcies according to these criteria, more than any other published study to the best of our knowledge. 2 The Appendix provides definitions of the CRSP delisting codes. 3 Our sample period starts in 1983, but Figure 1 does not contain the percentage of bankruptcy in 1983, because our bankruptcy prediction model relies on one-year ahead data as independent variables. Therefore, our actual sample only includes bankruptcy data from 1984. 4 The NBER defines a recession as -a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real gross domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.‖
Descriptive Statistics

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 2 instead segments bankruptcies by stock exchange listing. More than 80% of the firms in our sample that filed for bankruptcy were listed on NASDAQ.
The remaining percentage is almost evenly spread between the NYSE and AMEX.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Description of Input-Output Table
To measure external industry constraints-namely, customers' and suppliers' constraints-we use summarized versions of the input-output tables published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Specifically, the -Use Table 1 contains an overview of bankruptcies by IO codes. According to Panel A, before 1997, most bankruptcies occurred in manufacturing (37%) or services (19%).
As Panel B of Table 1 indicates, after 1998, almost 39% of the total bankruptcies happened in the manufacturing sector, followed by the information industry (15%) and then finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing, which account for 12% of the total bankruptcies registered during this period.
[INSERT 
Definition of Independent Variables
We use a dynamic logit regression method to analyze bankruptcy prediction (see Shumway, 2001 ) with five explanatory variables:
(1) Excess return (EXRET), or the monthly log excess return on each firm' stock return relative to the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return. Low past excess returns should increase the chance of bankruptcy, because the decrease in equity value increases leverage and therefore default probabilities.
(2) Relative size (RSIZ), which is the logarithm of each firm's market equity value (outstanding shares  stock prices) divided by the total NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market equity value. The lower the relative size, the higher the default probability, such that we expect a negative relationship between RSIZ and bankruptcy likelihood.
(3) Volatility of each firm's stock returns (SIGMA)-a sample standard deviation using the last 60 observable daily returns. 9 It measures the probability of the firm's asset values being below the default threshold, so we expect that higher SIGMA indicates a higher probability of bankruptcy.
(4) NI/TA, or the firm's net income divided by the adjusted total assets (see (5) below). This ratio typically represents a firm's profitability, and we expect a negative effect on bankruptcy.
(5) TL/TA, or the firm's total liabilities divided by the adjusted total assets. As a proxy of leverage, a firm with high TL/TA tends to have high probability of bankruptcy. We use adjusted total assets, instead of the raw total assets data from COMPUSTAT, to prevent potential errors of measurement in the assets' book values (TA) or generate outliers when used as denominators in calculating financial ratios. Thus we adjust the total assets following the procedure suggested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) . The adjusted total assets are the sum of 10% of the difference between market and book equity and the book value of total assets (see Campbell et al., 2008) :
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In addition to standard profitability and leverage variables, liquidity may determine bankruptcy. Firms often default because of their inability to pay their financial obligations on time due to the imbalance between their cash inflows and outflows (see Laitinen and Laitinen, 1998) . To the extent that managers opportunistically manipulate accruals, earnings (which depend significantly on net 9 The stock's volatility measure comes from Chava and Jarrow (2004) and differs from the method offered by Shumway (2001) , who calculates each firm's sigma for year t by regressing each stock's monthly returns in year t -1 on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return for the same year. Sigma is the standard deviation of the residual of this regression.
income) offer a less reliable measure, and cash flow-based variables might be preferable. 10 Thus we add a measure of liquidity in the form of the ratio of a company's cash and short-term assets to its adjusted total assets (CASH/TA). An increasing CASH/TA should indicate a smaller chance of bankruptcy.
We also include the market-to-book ratio (MB), or the market value of equity (ME) divided by book value of equity (BE value of their equity, driving up their market-to-book ratio; however, the stock market often discounts the market value of equity, given traders' negative predictions about those firms, driving down the market-to-book ratio. Thus, though MB has the potential to predict bankruptcy, it is unclear how it relates empirically to bankruptcy.
For the time being, we anticipate that increasing MB results in increasing bankruptcy likelihood, in line with empirical evidence from Campbell et al. (2008) .
Finally, to test for the effect of industrial structural constraints, we consider the internal industry constraint, measured by our Herfindahl index (H), and external industry constraints, including buyers' (C i,B ) and suppliers' (C i,S ) constraints, as we reviewed previously.
Yearly vs. Quarterly and Monthly Observation Intervals
Chava and Jarrow (2004) posit that monthly observation intervals can improve bankruptcy prediction, compared with yearly frequencies, because more frequent accounting reports (quarterly) provide more updated information about the company's financial health. However, considering the potential for earnings management in accounting reports, we wonder if quarterly accounting reports may be more accurate.
That is, companies might manage their earnings to avoid reporting losses or earnings decreases or to meet analysts' expectations at the end of each year. 12 Although earnings management could be used both quarterly and annually, prior research suggests that the extensiveness of such -massaging‖ of accounting information is far greater in quarterly reports, for three main reasons.
First, a firm can increase its quarterly earnings indirectly through accounting methods, such as by increasing accruals, or directly by postponing expenses to future quarters (Bernhardt and Campello, 2007) . Matsunaga and Park (2001) show that CEO bonuses provide managers an incentive to meet the earnings reported for the same quarter of the prior year, for example. Second, errors in a previous quarterly report must be corrected in the annual report, 13 and on average, these error corrections are negative, such that original quarterly reported earnings appear overstated (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989 enjoy an average quarterly return almost 3% higher than that of peers that fail to do so, even if investors discount the return after they notice earnings management practices (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002) . One study pays particular attention to the comparison of stock performance by firms that issue accurate annual reports and those that fudge quarterly reports. Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) document that firms that report earnings strings of at least 20 quarters (five years) with consecutive non-decreases enjoy abnormal returns of more than 20% per year during the first five years, much larger than the returns of firms that report five years of consecutive increases in annual (but not quarterly) reports.
Thus market participants appear to incorrectly value firm performance due to earnings management efforts, especially when companies manipulate their quarterly reports. The market also incorrectly interprets this accounting information. For a bankruptcy model then, market variables may not reflect firms' true financial situation.
To conclude that using quarterly accounting data is better than using yearly data thus
is debatable and open to challenge from empirical evidence.
Moreover, we cannot confirm if the superiority of monthly data over yearly data, as suggested by Chava and Jarrow (2004) , has persisted. 15 To test this effect over time, we construct separate yearly and monthly (using quarterly accounting data) observation interval data sets, following the procedures by Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) .
For the yearly observation interval, we merge data sets with annual firm-level accounting data from COMPUSTAT with monthly and daily equity price data from CRSP. A firm contributes an observation for every year after it starts appearing in the databases until the end of the sample period or its delisting year. To exploit data available in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT, we adjust our sample to contain 18,175 firms and 143,585 firm-year observations, which includes 3392 bankruptcies (according to our broad definition). In constructing the time-series variables, we lagged all independent variables one year, to ensure they were observable to the market at the beginning of each year. For example, if the dependent variable occurs in year t, we based the market information of independent variables on year t -1, with the exception of SIGMA, which we computed as the sample standard deviation using the last 60 observable daily returns. The annual excess return (EXRET) is computed from the sum of monthly returns minus the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return for the previous year. The relative size (RSIZ)
is the logarithm of each firm's market equity value, divided by the weighted average of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market equity value at the end of previous year. For the accounting variables (NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB), we matched every yearly observation (calendar year) from the CRSP database with accounting data about the fiscal year, with a one-year lag. We removed any yearly observation with missing accounting variables. Similar to previous literature (Chava and Jarrow, 2004) , we also discard outliers (e.g., typos, reporting errors) and truncate all variables at the 1st and 15 Recall that their sample period is from 1963 to 1998. 99th percentiles of their pooled distributions across all firm-year observations. In addition, we replace any observation below the 1st percentile with the 1st percentile and any observation above the 99th percentile with the 99th percentile.
When dealing with the monthly observation interval, we still use daily and monthly equity price data from CRSP data, but instead of using the annual report in COMPUSTAT, we match the most recent previous quarterly accounting data to the current month. Thus both the accounting and market data are lagged by a month so that they are available to the market at the time of the estimation. this observation data set, compared with the yearly set, results because we find more missing data in the quarterly accounting reports. To limit the influence of outliers even further, we winsorize all our explanatory variables using a 5th/95th percentile interval (as suggested by Campbell et al., 2008) .
We report summary statistics for our 10 main explanatory variables for both firm-yearly and firm-monthly observations in Panels A and B of Table 2 , respectively.
The average value of EXRET is −7.33% per year (Panel A) and -1.36% per month (see Panel B), which reflects the underperformance of stocks during our sample period. Individual stock returns are extremely volatile; the average value of the annualized firm-level volatility (SIGMA) is 63% and 56% for the yearly and monthly data sets, respectively. The net income relative to adjusted total asset (NI/TA) is negative in both data sets, which indicates that firms had no profits during this period.
Furthermore, the proportion of the total liability to adjusted total assets is approximately 50% for both data sets. That is, firms tend to match their liabilities with their equity.
[INSERT We find just these trends, for both yearly and monthly data. It is reasonable that firms about to go bankrupt have less net income, but they also might temporarily raise their net income reports by recognizing lower expenses to prevent investors from perceiving their financial distress. This strategy may bias bankruptcy predictions. In Table 3 , the average NI/TA among bankrupt firm-year observations is -0.321, while the average for bankrupt firm-quarter observations, multiplied by 4, is around -0.232. 18 Firms appear to try to make their net income look better in the quarterly report, whereas the annual report provides more realistic accounting information. In turn, we expect that the data set with yearly observation intervals is more likely to provide greater explanatory power for bankruptcy models.
Bankruptcy Prediction Model
Following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) , and Campbell et al.
(2008), we use a simple hazard model to estimate the probabilities of bankruptcy over the next period in a dynamic logit model. The main advantage of a simple hazard model is that we can control for and adjust the firm's at-risk period. For longer sampling periods, it is important to acknowledge that some firms file for bankruptcy after many years of being at risk, whereas other firms fail in their first risky year. Our model incorporates time-varying covariates that change over time; if a firm's financial health deteriorates before bankruptcy, its financial data reveal its changing health over time.
We assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy in the next period follows 18 The sum of four quarterly net income values equals annual net income, so to compare annual NI/TA and quarterly NI/TA, we must multiple quarterly NI/TA by 4 to approximate annual NI/TA. a logistic distribution, expressed as: 
Bankruptcy Prediction with Industry Constraints
To provide empirical evidence regarding how industry constraints relate to bankruptcy, we estimate a dynamic logit model with five standard variables (EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, and TL/TA), two extra variables (CASH/TA and MB), and three industry constraint variables (H, C i,B , and C i,S ) as regressors. We implement the dynamic logit model for both yearly and monthly observation intervals to learn whether a shorter interval data set can improve bankruptcy predictions. The yearly and monthly estimation results for firms traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during 1983-2008 appear in Panels A and B of Table 4 .
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Yearly observation interval data set
In Panel A of Table 4 , we note first that for market-driven variables (EXRET, RSIZ, and SIGMA), and in agreement with prior findings, excess return and relative size relate negatively to bankruptcy predictions, whereas volatility has a positive impact. They are all statistically significant at the 1% level. 19 The signs of these coefficients are consistent with simple economic intuition; for example, smaller firms tend to use more short-term debt than larger firms, which make them riskier and more prone to financial distress and eventual bankruptcy. We next turn to the two added explanatory variables with accounting information.
We observe CASH/TA is significantly and negatively related to bankruptcy across all models, which agrees with our expected intuition that a firm is more likely to go bankrupt when it cannot pay its creditors under liquidity limitations. Furthermore, MB meets our expectation; it shows a significantly positive sign in all models in Panel A of Table 4 : The probability of bankruptcy increases when the market value is unusually high relative to the book value. Table 4 also reveals how internal or external industry constraints can explain bankruptcies, beyond market-driven variables or accounting ratios. In Panel A, the Herfindahl index is significantly positive for bankruptcies in columns 1 and 4, which is consistent with our first hypothesis, namely, that a higher concentration ratio (lower industry internal constraint) leads to a higher incidence of firm bankruptcy. Firms in highly concentrated industries are more likely to file for bankruptcy, even after we control for other market and accounting variables.
We also study the relationship between external industry constraints and bankruptcy prediction; according to Panel A of Table 4 , in the first regression result (full model) and Model (3), the customer constraint (C i,B ) coefficient is positive and significant, in support of our second hypothesis. That is, the stronger customers' constraints, the higher the incidence of firm bankruptcy. Finally, the estimated coefficient for supplier constraints (C i,S ) is not significant in the full model but is negative and significant in Model (3), from which we removed the H variable. Thus the relationship between suppliers' constraints and bankruptcy remains unclear.
In summary, according to our yearly estimation results, we can not only reconfirm the effect of previously used bankruptcy variables but also provide empirical evidence in support of our two hypotheses.
Monthly observation interval data set
Following a similar procedure, we report the monthly estimation results in Panel B of Table 4 . In general, these results are similar to our yearly outcomes, except that we find the CASH/TA variable is insignificant though still negative.
The value of the pseudo-R 2 based on yearly data also is 25% larger than that based on monthly data: 0.34 (last row, Panel A) compared with 0.27 (last row, Panel B), across all models in Table 4 . Unlike Chava and Jarrow (2004) , we find that the in-sample explanatory power of the bankruptcy prediction model based on yearly data is greater than that based on monthly data, perhaps because quarterly accounting reports do not deliver more accurate information pertaining to bankruptcy likelihood. Furthermore, more recent market information may incorrectly reflect firms' actual situation before bankruptcies.
Robustness Tests: Yearly vs. Quarterly Data
In-sample performance
For a more robust comparison of in-sample performance, we recomputed the pseudo-R 2 for the years 1984-2008 by implementing the dynamic logit model with five standard variables (EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, and TL/TA). As Table 5 shows, the pseudo-R 2 from the yearly data is greater than that derived from monthly years. We lack empirical results after 2008, but we maintain that yearly data are more useful than monthly data in normal times but especially in the years after recessions.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] Overall, the estimated coefficients are significant and with appropriate signs for both yearly and monthly data, except for CASH/TA, which becomes insignificant in the monthly data. The information from the past year seems more useful for predicting bankruptcies than information from the past month. Therefore, we use yearly data in our bankruptcy prediction model to determine how industry factors might explain bankruptcies.
Out-of-sample performance
To compare the out-of-sample performance of estimates from bankruptcy
prediction models, we also analyze how well they forecast bankruptcy events before they appear, using only past available information. Specifically, we use the area under Our aim is to investigate whether yearly interval data have better forecasting ability than monthly interval data, as we found for in-sample performance, so we implement the same model (logit regression, five variables). In addition, it is worthwhile to compare the yearly out-of-sample performance on market-driven (logit regression with EXRET, RSIZ, and SIGMA) and accounting-driven (logit regression with NI/TA and TL/TA) variable models against their monthly out-of-sample performance. The empirical AUC results appear in Table 6 .
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] In terms of the yearly interval, the AUC for the recent sample period with Shumway's model and the accounting-driven model is 0.885 and 0.79, respectively-greater than the AUC values reported by Chava and Jarrow (2004) , that is, 0.868 and 0.723, respectively. The relatively larger difference in the accounting-driven variable model may reflect two main influences. First, our sample is more recent. Second, we remove observations with missing previous year accounting data to avoid potential bias. Furthermore, the results in Table 6 indicate that the AUCs in yearly interval observations are greater than those in monthly data across all three models, consistent with our in-sample analysis. Therefore, we confirm that using yearly data is better than monthly data for both in-sample explanatory power and out-of-sample forecasting ability. Finally, we find that the AUC in the monthly, market-driven variable model (0.846) is higher than in Shumway's model (0.806). The performance differential reflects that addition of two more accounting variables; that is, additional quarterly accounting information cannot raise forecasting abilities and even might provide incorrect information. This result supports our previous supposition that earnings management efforts in quarterly accounting reports bias predictions of bankrupt events. In summary, with yearly data, the best model (inand out-of-sample) includes both accounting and market-based variables. However, when we use monthly market data and quarterly accounting reports, the best model only features market data.
Bankruptcy Models Within and Across Industries
With industry-level measures (H, C i,B , and C i,S ), we have connected bankruptcies to industry effects, including competition and bargaining power. In addition to firms' characteristics, greater internal concentration in an industry and less external bargaining power compared with other industries increase the possibilities of bankruptcy. To further this investigation, we next split the information related to our seven main firm-level variables (EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB) into within-and across-industry components. No previous research has outlined this relationship, though some studies tend to indicate that differences in firm characteristics are more important predictors of expected returns than are industry-level variables. For example, Asness, Porter, and Stevens (2000) decompose book-to-market ratios into within-and across-industry components and find that the value effect is primarily within-industry, and Lewellen (1999) shows that a book-to-market factor explains common variation in returns unrelated to industry.
We adopt Asness et al.'s (2000) methodology to separate our market-wide independent variable 21 into two components: (1) and Iit X , so our new prediction relies on withinand across-industry independent variables related to EXRET, RSIZ, SIGMA, NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB. 21 Our market-wide independent variable includes three market-driven variables (EXRET, RSIZ, and SIGMA) and four accounting-driven variables (NI/TA, TL/TA, CASH/TA, and MB).
Bankruptcy Prediction Based on Within-and Across-Industry Variables
Column 1 estimates a regression on all within-and across-industry variables, Column 2 contains the regression for only within-industry variables, and Column 3 estimates the regression with only across-industry variables. The notations (W) and (A) in Table   7 refer to within-and across-industry variables, respectively.
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] In Column 1, almost all within-and across-industry variables enter significantly and with a sign consistent with the market-wide variable in Panel A of Table 4 . The first exception is that EXRET(A) and TL/TA(A) become insignificant, though still consistent with the expected sign. In contrast, MB(A) switches signs and is statistically significant. These results imply that the economic intuition perfectly fits the intra-industry scenario, but variation on industry-level characteristics sometimes cannot predict bankruptcy. In Column 2, all variables demonstrate the expected sign and are highly statistically significant, which reconfirms that a firm's characteristics, relative to its industry, are useful for gauging the incidence of bankruptcy. Not surprisingly, Column 3 shows that EXRET(A) becomes insignificant, and both TL/TA(A) and MB(A) become negatively significant, in contrast with our economic intuition. Moreover, we note that the value of pseudo-R 2 in the within-industry model is 0.33, but it is only 0.02 in the across-industry model. Thus it appears that bankruptcy prediction ability stems mainly from the variation of a firm's characteristics relative to its located industry, and industrial characteristics have very minor impact on bankruptcy predictions.
Out-of-Sample Performance
In Table 8 we compare AUC computed from predicted probabilities across all out-of-sample periods. According to Figure 1 , there are five kinds of out-of-sample periods, based on three recessions (1990-1992, 2000-2002, and 2008) and two relatively stable periods between each pair of recessions (1993-1999 and 2003-2007) .
For each out-of-sample period, we estimate each model with seven years of data before the predicted year. 22 The model notation is as follows: Model (1) To compare forecasting abilities with respect to characteristics within and across industries, we also report the ratios of the AUC of the within-industry model to that of Model (1) (W/Model (1)) and of the AUC of the across-industry model to that of Model (1) (A/Model (1)). The AUC based on the W model is almost the same as that in Model (1), and the ratio is approximately 99% for all periods. This finding reinforces the extremely high explanatory power for the within-industry variables. Yet the ratio of AUC on A relative to Model (1) ranges from 59% to 69%; that is, across-industry effects provide a poor ability to predict the incidence of bankruptcy.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Conclusion
We have examined two issues with this research: the effects of the degrees of competition and connection with customers and suppliers in a given industry on bankruptcy predictions and the relative performance of market-driven and accounting variables in terms of forecasting bankruptcy, as well as potential distortions in accounting information over time. Accordingly, we have proposed and tested two hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that greater concentration ratios lead to a higher incidence of bankruptcy for firms in that industry. We also predict that stronger 22 We choose seven years as the in-sample length in accordance with our available in-sample data period for the first out-of-sample period, or 1983-1989. customer constraints increase the incidence rates of bankruptcy, because these firms are more vulnerable to adverse economic conditions. We test and find support for both hypotheses. We also find that almost all the strength in bankruptcy predictions stems from the variation of the firm's characteristics relative to its industry, whereas industry-specific characteristics have a negligible impact on the accuracy of bankruptcy predictions.
Moreover, we find that models based on yearly data offer 25% more explanatory power, on average, than the models based on monthly data. When using yearly data, the best model (both in-and out-of-sample) integrates accounting and market-based variables; that is, both sources contain relevant information about bankruptcy likelihoods over time. However, when we use monthly market data and quarterly accounting reports, the best model only includes market data. These findings thus raise some challenging questions for ongoing research. In particular, the better forecasting performance of the accounting variables measured in yearly intervals, EXRET = excess annual return over the value-weighted NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ return; (2) RSIZ = relative size, measured as the log of the firm's market capitalization divided by total NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ market cap; (3) SIGMA = standard deviation computed by using the last sixty observable daily returns; (4) NI/TA = net income/adjusted total assets; (5) TL/TA = total liabilities/adjusted total assets; (6) CASH/TA = ratio of a company's cash and short-term assets to its adjusted total assets; (7) MB = market-to-book ratio; (8) EXRET = excess annual return over the value-weighted NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ return; (2) RSIZ = relative size, measured as the log of the firm's market capitalization divided by total NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ market cap; (3) SIGMA = standard deviation computed by using the last sixty observable daily returns; (4) NI/TA = net income/adjusted total assets; (5) TL/TA = total liabilities/adjusted total assets; (6) CASH/TA = ratio of a company's cash and short-term assets to its adjusted total assets; and (7) MB = market-to-book ratio. Panels A and B refer to bankrupt firm-year observations and bankrupt firm-month observations, respectively. Parameter estimates are given first, followed by the absolute value of the z-statistics reported in parentheses. *Significant at 5%. **Significant at 1%. The McFadden R-square is in the final row. forecasting accuracy. An ROC curve is constructed from the predicted probabilities computed for the out-of-sample period. The five kinds of out-of-sample periods reflect three recessions (1990-1992, 2000-2002, and 2008) and two relatively stable periods (1993-1999 and 2003-2007) . For each out-of-sample period, each model is estimated with seven years of data before the predicted year.
Model ( 
